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But for all these extracts quoted, the writer must say the theory that mono-ideism was better attained through a process of relaxation, a surrender, a dropping away of ideas, than through a process of concentrating ideas, bringing them to a focus, had its inception in a rather intimate acquaintance with a mystic of the old type, a woman who believed she had "second sight," who believed that she had messages from the spirit world, who knew God face to face. She was kind enough to try to describe her mental processes and always it was freedom from unworthy or unkind thoughts, freedom from worry, a desire to do good and to be good which was necessary for the complete state of relaxation into which she entered when she desired to use any of these special gifts. Many a time as she went about her work of healing, for she was a masseuse by profession using "magnetic" or "faith" healing as the situation demanded, the writer has seen her drop into the relaxed state.

And still it is all mysterious even though we classify and name it, as are all the processes of consciousness for the matter of that. But it is the real thing, an experience which comes to all men at times in a vague and imperfect form, and to a few men in its perfection. But it is given to but few men to be geniuses in any line and the most of us are content to plod along with our second rate faculties and powers.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Syndicalism and Philosophical Realism. J. W. SCOTT. London: A. & C. Black. 1919. Pp. 215.

Speculations in politics and social science, no less than in philosophy and psychology, have no doubt been vitiated by an extreme "intellectualism." Mr. Graham Wallas, whose position is on the whole anti-intellectual, has given an important warning against going too far in the opposite direction. He asserts that "the loose anti-intellectualism which now threatens to take the place of the old intellectualism may prove to be infinitely more dangerous in the twentieth century."¹ Mr. J. W. Scott's *Syndicalism and Philosophical Realism* is a vivid portrayal of the close connection between the iconoclasms of revolutionary socialism and certain anti-intellectual tendencies in contemporary philosophical thought. The relation between the general ideas put forward by philosophy and the events taking place in the social and political world is one exceedingly difficult to determine. In this book we have the general thesis

¹ *Great Society*, p. 43.

that there is a close connection between Syndicalism and certain tendencies common to the evolutionism of Bergson and the realism of Bertrand Russell. While there is much in these writers which is antagonistic, still, it is maintained, they possess a common ingredient; they exhibit an element of realism, and it is this realistic element that links them to Syndicalism.

We briefly summarize the main points of the book:

Syndicalism is characterized by a violent distrust of both law and government. This distrust is the direct result of the failure of state socialism. Not only has the state socialist failed to accomplish reform through political means, but the end, *viz.*, the reformation of society as a whole, is altogether too vague and remote. The economic advantage of a class is an immediate end. The revolutionary socialist, distrustful of the power of a state to legislate a millennium into existence, smashes through the thin and to him futile and entirely unessential order of the law, and goes in directly for immediate economic gain. This is Syndicalism. Its dominating impulse is to *seize the immediate*. Now there is another sense in which the socialist was guilty of a social betrayal. Marx had taught that the capitalistic class would disappear through the natural law of class warfare. But the bourgeoisie became benevolent. Hence a cessation of the spirit of class warfare. But this militant idea was too powerful a one to be given up. Class struggle must be made a reality. Syndicalism, with its doctrine of violence, comes forward to keep the militant spirit alive.

We shall now see how certain realistic tendencies in the thought of Bergson and Russell are linked to this social movement. The author is careful to define just what he means by realism. This account of realism is one of the most interesting features of the book. Realism, of course, is in some sense opposed to idealism, but not to any idealism; not, for example, to Berkeleyan idealism which after all did nothing but change the names of things. Realism is opposed to the *constructive* idealism of the Kantian type. The idealist distrusts the given, he is bent on working it over into something more akin to his own nature. The given as given is not real; in order to become reality it must become transformed. It is not a question of what the world is made of, but of what it is made into. To transform, not to conform is the idealistic aim. Now the realist represents that "bent of mind which is averse to construction." "This taking of the real to be what it is given as, is the doctrine which we propose to call realism."² Realism means grasping the given. Furthermore it cherishes the belief that what comes first in order of time is better in

² *Syndicalism and Philosophical Realism*, p. 67.

point of fact. To recover the immediate is to reveal the source of value. We have here something of the faith of Rousseau. Reality as given is good. From this follows the demand to keep the immediate inviolate. To be realistic means to respect and cherish the given nature or man.

In so far as Bergson's psychology reinstates the self, and in so far as his metaphysics involves an interpretation of the world without us by the spirit within us, he is an idealist. But he leaves us with a realistic will. "The realism in Bergson consists in the affinity between what he says is the true nature of the will and what the will is first given as; in the child or in the animal. The point of affinity is its being not rationally constructed; in other words, the unpredictableness of its movements, its incalculableness."³ It is just this incalculableness of the will, issuing in a "loose" anti-intellectualism, and justifying a relapse into the primitive forces of original nature, that affords encouragement and inspiration to the Syndicalists. Syndicalism typifies tremendous power coupled with irresponsibility. "The scheme is simply this: First, you strike. If you are a men's leader you have little idea further, except to keep up the 'inspiring struggle.' If you are a striker you have no idea further. If you are M. Sorel himself, you see that what you are making for is the 'general strike,' but you also see that you don't really *see* it; it not being a thought of yours, but only a 'myth.' And when you are a Bergson you understand all this, you understand what this peculiarly 'integral' mode of apprehension can be, which is not thought, but above thought."⁴

Incalculableness is what relates Bergson to Syndicalism. A certain narrowness of will is what links Russell to it. The earlier aim of socialism was to reform society by political means. But this proved altogether futile. The complete reformation of society as an end is too indefinite, too vague, too tame. Even as a "myth" it does not arouse any very primitive or militant impulses. Something narrower and nearer, something more directly attached to the primitive, is needed. Syndicalism, with a zeal to grasp the immediate, aims at the ascendancy of a class rather than the good of the community as a whole. It aims at less in order to accomplish more.

What is there in the realism of Russell which relates it to this tendency to accept and justify narrowness? Realism, as we have seen, is averse to construction. Conventions, institutions and the forms of social and political organization are works of rational construction. Realism, with its predilection for the immediate and its

³ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

deification of the primitive, is iconoclastic in regard to the constructed order and organization of society. Now Mr. Russell has a profound respect for personality. And personality is a thing once for all given. Its essence is narrowed to a certain principle of vitality realistically and primitively conceived. Our original impulsive nature is more fundamental and therefore more real, and therefore more valuable, than our desiderative and rational nature. It should for this reason be accepted, protected and cherished. We have here a narrowing of personality to the given and original impulsive nature of man. The social aim is to provide the means of liberating these primitive and vital forces. To liberate life requires a pretty radical overhauling of the existing institutions.

Such is the outline of a book which is in the main descriptive. We gather, however, that the author is entirely out of sympathy with both realism and Syndicalism. A subtle irony marks an implied criticism. More specifically we are told that, as regards Bergson, his doctrine of intuition involves no more than a strenuous effort to be idle. A dangerous doctrine as a philosophy of labor! And Mr. Russell forgets that there is a problem of making a soul before there is a problem of liberating it. This, of course, in terms of the initial definitions involves on the part of the author an abandonment of the realistic position and an acceptance of the idealistic ideal of construction.

It seems to me that Mr. Scott has performed a significant and an important task. Whether or not there is a direct causal relation connecting the realism of Bergson and Russell with Syndicalism, there is a logical connection. Syndicalism is just the kind of thing that would happen if the anti-intellectualism of Bergson and the realism of Russell were applied to social problems. Whether or not we are realists or idealists—the names mean little—it seems to me that man's hope for the future lies in the creative and constructive work of intelligence. It may be that in point of time intelligence comes later than impulse and instinct. But that is no excuse for mistaking origins for values. All rational as well as social construction has, or should have, a natural basis. But the natural basis is not itself the reality. To deify the primitive and original nature of man is to prepare the way for social disintegration. To be sure the old intellectualism largely ignored this primitive element. It constructed an "ideal" order with no natural basis. The New Realism, with its bias for the given, runs the danger of limiting itself to an unenlightened naturalism. Is there not more hope in a new intellectualism, the finding of the real and the valuable in what Santayana would call the union of impulse and ideation?

M. T. McCLURE.